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PIERRE JACOB 
EXTERNAL ISM REVIS ITED:  
IS THERE SUCH A THING AS NARROW CONTENT?  
(Received 31 May, 1989) 
There are presently, or so it seems to me, three main views about the 
individuation of the content of intentional mental states. First, there is 
the no content view: the view that the content (of an intentional mental 
state) is an ordinary folk pre-scientific oncept which can play no role 
in a respectable mature scientific psychology. Second there is a dualist 
(or bifurcationist) view of content which posits a distinction between 
narrow and broad content. Although it acknowledges the (obvious) 
existence of broad content and because it assumes the existence and 
legitimacy of narrow content, dualism is consistent with an individualist 
view of content. Third, there is anti-individualism, Which is a monist 
view about the individuation of the content of intentional mental states 
such as thoughts, beliefs and other propositional attitudes, i.e. states 
which we ordinarily or commonsensically describe or ascribe to a 
person by means of a complex sentence with a psychological verb 
(describing the person's attitude) prefixed by a singular term referring 
to the person and followed by an embedded clause (or "that"-clause) 
expressing the content of the person's attitude. Unlike dualism, anti- 
individualism assumes that there is no room for a narrow individuation 
of the content of an individual's intentional mental states ince it cannot 
ever be individuated independently from the individual's (physical or 
social) environment. 
According to anti-individualism, a person's brain, his or her brain 
states and (probably) his or her "subdoxastic" cognitive states are 
located within the person's cranial box. 1 Many if not all of the person's 
thoughts and intentional mental states however would be spread unto 
the person's physical and social environment on which they depend for 
their individuation. According to anti-individualism, a person's physical 
and social environment is inherently part of the content of his or her 
thoughts and other intentional mental states. So if anti-individualism is 
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right, then what Fodor (1980, p. 229) refers to as "the long tradition, 
including both Rationalists and Empiricists, which takes it as axiomatic 
that one's experience (and a forfiori, one's beliefs) might have been just 
as they are even if the world had been quite different from the way it is" 
is just wrong. 
There are at least two versions of, or two main roads leading to, anti- 
individualism depending on whether one focuses upon the contribution 
of particular ("physical") objects located in a person's ("physical") 
environment to the content of his or her so-called "singular thoughts" 
or upon the contribution of a person's (social and) linguistic ommunity 
to the content of his or her more general thoughts. The first road is 
roughly to adapt the "theory of direct reference" initially proposed by 
Donnellan, Kripke, and Kaplan for the analysis of the ("Russellian") 
contents of utterances (of sentences containing singular terms) to the 
contents of thoughts and intentional mental states (thereby expressed). 
Such is the strategy of Evans (1982) and McDowell (1977) when they 
argue that the content of what they call a "singular thought" depends 
for its very existence (or "availability") on the existence of the object 
to which the thought applies: on their view, unless the object of a 
purported singular thought exists or unless the singular term contained 
in the sentence xpressing the thought and purportedly used to refer to 
the object has a reference, the purported thought fails to qualify as a 
genuine singular thought -- if not as a thought at all. This is not the 
road chosen by Tyler Burge in his argument for social anti-individualism 
and I will not examine it here. Burge's anti-individualism can be seen as 
a possible conclusion derived from an argument constructed out of a 
series of thought-experiments the first of which perhaps goes back to 
Putnam's famous (1974) Twin Earth thought-experiment -- where the 
argument relies essentially upon a semantic analysis of the truth-condi- 
tions of "that"-clauses used to ascribe beliefs and other intentional 
mental states. 
In the present paper, I want to propose an alternative to Burge's 
anti-individualist interpretation of his important hought-experiments, 
an alternative which is closely akin to the individualist response provided 
by Brian Loar (1987a, b) and which I take to be consistent with the 
dualist view of content which has been espoused by a number of 
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philosophers. In the first two sections of the paper, I will briefly 
examine a number of possible reactions to Putnam's initial Twin Earth 
thought-experiment. I  particular, I want to examine the possible de- 
fense of content-dualism drawn from the parallel between the contents 
of mental states and the meanings of words in natural languages. In the 
third section, I will lay out as explicitly as I can Burge's argument for 
anti-individualism and for his rejection of content-dualism based on 
thought-experiments of his own. In the fourth section, I will cast doubt 
on Burge's premisses. In the fifth and last section, I will accept Burge's 
conclusion and I will try to argue that his monist anti-individualist view 
of content still requires a further premiss which I examine critically. I 
will then provide an individualist alternative to the premiss in question 
and sketch my own dualist interpretation f Burge's thought-experiments 
which will be based on the innocuous assumption that a speaker's 
utterance is meant to be an interpretation f his or her thought. 
I. HOW TO DERIVE  THE THREE V IEWS ABOUT CONTENT FROM 
TWIN EARTH?  
As is well known, Putnam (1974) imagined that on Twin Earth the 
same word "water", which is used on Earth to refer to the liquid with 
molecular structure H20, is used to refer to a different liquid with many 
similar phenomenological properties but with a different molecular 
structure. So we are to imagine that for each and every of my utterances 
of a sentence containing the word "water" on Earth, my twin (or my 
doppelggnger) utters a different oken of the same sentence-type con- 
taining the word "water". Two such simultaneous tterances of the same 
word-types will have different truth-conditions for the word "water" on 
Earth and the word "water" on Twin Earth do not have the same 
conditions of satisfaction. We may suppose that the fact that, unlike my 
twin's, my brain might contain H20 molecules (or that it is the brain of 
a person whose body contains HzO molecules) is irrelevant o the 
identity of my twin's and my brain states. 2 If so, we may assume that my 
twin and I are in relevantly identical brain states, identical internal 
physical and functional states, that we have the same behavioral dis- 
positions, that the histories of our respective interactions with proximal 
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stimuli are the same -- although some of the distal causes of our mental 
lives and behaviors (e.g. H20 molecules as opposed to some other 
chemical compound) are different. 
To many philosophers, principle (a) has seemed like a natural 
constraint on any plausible concept hat deserves to be called content 
and principle (b) has seemed like a reasonable condition on any 
"scientific" approach to the content of mental states: 
(a) 
(b) 
content is or should determine truth-conditions; 3 
individuals in the same "physical" condition (in the same 
brain state) should be said to be in a psychological (or 
mental) state with the same content; 
or equivalently 
(b') the content of the psychological (or mental) state of a person 
should supervene on his or her "physical" (brain) state. 
From Putnam's Twin Earth thought-experiment together with premisses 
(a) and (b), the three competing views about the individuation of the 
contents of mental states which I alluded to at the beginning can be 
derived: the no content view, the dualist view of content and the monist 
anti-individualist view of content. 
First it may be and has been argued (most notably by Stich 1978a, 
1983, 1988, who calls the argument "the Autonomy argument") that 
the thought-experiment jeopardizes the commonsensical view that 
thoughts, beliefs and other propositional attitudes play a role in the 
explanation of human action and behavior in virtue of their contents. 
Let us ask: does one member of a pair of Putnamian doppelg/ingers 
believe the same thing as the other member of the pair when each 
utters the sentence "The water in my bath-tub is too hot"? In view of 
the fact that their two simultaneous utterances have different truth- 
conditions (by maxim (a) narrowly or severely construed as asserting 
the identity of content with truth-conditions), it is tempting to give a 
straightforward negative answer. But by assumption the doppelg/ingers 
are in relevantly identical brain states. So it seems to follow that the 
property of believing that the water in one's bath-tub is too hot does not 
supervene on a person's (the speaker's) brain state or internal physical 
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constitution. If now we combine this proposition with the plausible view 
(maxim Co)) that the psychological explanation of a person's action and 
behavior does or should appeal only to states or properties of a person 
which do supervene on the person's internal physical and functional 
condition, we reach the conclusion that a property such as believing 
that the water in one's bath-tub is too hot cannot be invoked in a 
psychological explanation ofwhy each member of the pair of Putnamian 
doppelg/ingers did select he same word-types to express their respec- 
tive thought and to predict he fact they are both likely to turn on (the 
faucet for) cold water. Stieh has exploited this argument to cast doubt 
on the explanatory utility and scientific respectability of content. 
Before I examine Burge's own reaction to Putnam's thought-experi- 
ment, I want to pause briefly to emphasize that Putnam himself suggested 
two views one might take: a monist anti-individualist view pursued by 
Burge and a dualist view. 
One may argue that the difference in the extension of an utterance of 
"water" on Earth and on Twin Earth counts as a difference in meaning. 
Let us call this the "thick" sense of the meaning of "water". On the thick 
sense, "meaning is not in the head" and none of an Earthian "water"- 
utterances on Twin Earth could express a true proposition. This is the 
monist anti-individualist line taken by Burge -- I shall return to it 
momentarily. 
What motivates the content-dualist reaction is that, although the 
word "water" does not have the same extension on Earth and on Twin 
Earth, it is natural to degcribe, as Putnam (1974, p. 224) does, the pair 
of doppelggngers a "exact duplicates in appearance, feelings, thoughts, 
interior monologue tc.", ff so, the thought-experiment suggests that 
there must be a non truth-conditional notion of content. The dualist 
reaction has been accepted by a number of philosophers who might 
otherwise disagree on much else (Bach 1982, Block 1986. Dennett 
1982. McGinn 1982, Field 1977, Fodor 1987. Harman 1982, Kaplan 
1977. Loar 1987a, b, Perry 1977) and it has been expressed in terms 
of a distinction between broad (or wide) content and narrow content. 
The former has been linked to the truth-conditions of a thought, the 
]Latter to the role of the thought in deliberation mad the planning of 
action (what is also called the thought's "functional" or "'conceptual 
role"). So the content-dualist would say that by their "water"-utterances 
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each of a pair of Putnamian doppelg/ingers expresses a thought with the 
same narrow content and different broad contents. 
Rather than emphasizing the fact that the "thick" meaning of "water" 
is not the same on Earth and on Twin Earth, one may also argue, as 
Putnam did, that "water" is an indexical word or has a hidden indexical 
component. On the one hand an indexical word like 'T', "now" or 
"here" has a constant linguistic meaning tacitly known to any competent 
speaker or hearer of the language -- what Kaplan calls the "character" 
of the word. In this "thin" sense of the word, linguistic "meaning" is just 
what is tacitly known to any competent user of a word in virtue of 
which he or she is able to use the word appropriately. It is not what 
allows any competent speaker to pick up unerroneously any correct 
instance of the extension of the word. In the case of a natural kind 
word, linguistic meaning must be supplemented by specialized knowl- 
edge of the world. In the case of demonstratives, it may have to be 
supplemented by assumptions about the speaker's intentions (as in the 
case of a token of "he"). On the other hand 'T', "now" or "here" can be 
used to refer to different persons, different instants of time or different 
places on different occasions of use. So indexical words make different 
contributions to the propositional content hey are used to express on 
different occasions. To claim that "water" is indexical amounts to 
assuming that the "thin" linguistic meaning of "water" (what Putnam 
calls the "stereotype" associated with the word) is constant and the 
propositional contribution made by "water" changes as the word is 
uttered on Earth or on Twin Earth. 
II. WHY CAN'T  NARROW CONTENT BE L INGUIST IC  MEANING? 
So the content-dualist may rightly be asked: What is the narrow content 
of a "water"-utterance such that, in spite of the fact that "water" refers 
to H20 on Earth, but not on Twin Earth, two members of a pair of 
Putnamian doppelg/ingers can be said to express the same narrow 
thought-constituent by means of their respective utterance of the word 
"water" on Earth and on Twin Earth? It is tempting for a content- 
dualist to respond that the narrow content in question is just the 
linguistic meaning of the indexical word "water". In other words, it is 
tempting for the content-dualist to identify, as Kaplan (1977) and Perry 
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(1977, 1979) have done, the broad content of a thought with the truth- 
conditions of the utterance (its "thick" meaning) used to express it and 
the narrow content of the thought with the linguistic meaning of the 
(indexical) sentence uttered, as represented in Diagram 1: 
UTI'ERANCES THOUGHTS 
linguistic meaning narrow content 
truth-conditions broad content 
DIAGRAM I 
There are at least two objections to this duafist interpretation of
Putnam's thought-experiment. One may, as Burge (1982) does, object 
to the claim that "water" is an indexical word on the ground that with a 
genuine indexical word like "here", I may on different occasions refer to 
two different places and say something true on both occasions. If 
"water" were indexical, it would have a constant linguistic meaning and 
would change reference on different occasions. So were I to visit Twin 
Earth, by my use of the word "water", I could say something true. But 
according to Burge (1982, pp. 104--105), who accepts Putnam's other 
suggestion that extension is part of meaning and that "meanings are not 
in the head", I would thereby express a falsehood since there is no 
water on Twin Earth. Adjudication between the two views is no easy 
task. I will here merely record the fact that there are two possible rival 
views one can take to describe the situation: the view that by his 
"water"-utterance on Twin Earth, an Earthian would automatically say 
something false since there is no water there; and the view that although 
"water"-utterances do not express the same propositions on Earth and 
on Twin Earth, an Earthian utterance of a sentence containing the word 
"water" is not automatically false; it may be true. The former view 
entails that "water" on Earth and "water" on Twin Earth are homonyms. 
The latter is compatible with the claim that "water" is indexical. 
Actually, the former view cannot be correct for suppose that, were an 
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Earthian to utter "This is water" on Twin Earth, his utterance would be 
false; however had he instead uttered "This is not water", his utterance 
would automatically be true insofar as it is the negation of a falsehood. 
The second objection which seems more serious to me (and which 
has been expressed among others by Loewer & Lepore 1986, Recanati 
1989 and Wettstein 1986) is that the narrow content of a thought 
cannot be identified with the linguistic meaning of a sentence containing 
an indexical or demonstrative expression. I will give three reasons for 
rejecting such an identification, the first two being closely related. 
First, the linguistic meaning of the first person indexical pronoun 'T' 
is roughly the rule: 'By any token of 'T' the speaker efers to himself or 
herself'. So by virtue of its linguistic meaning (tacitly known to speaker 
and hearer), 'T' presents its referent as the speaker to both speaker and 
hearer. But it is plausible enough that the speaker, who thinks of 
himself or herself in a first person way, does not think of himself or 
herself as the speaker or under the description the person who uttered 
this token of "I"; nor does the speaker think of himself or herself in the 
same way as the hearer thinks of the speaker since the hearer, unlike 
the speaker, might think of the speaker as the speaker. So the narrow 
thought-constituent expressible by 'T' cannot be identical to the lin- 
guistic meaning of 'T'. 
Second, the linguistic meaning of the second person pronoun "you" 
is roughly for both speaker and hearer: 'By any token of "you" the 
speaker efers to the addressee or the person to whom the utterance is
addressed'. The speaker's narrow thought-constituent expressed by 
"you" might be identical to the linguistic meaning of "you", since the 
speaker might think of his or her hearer as his or her addressee. But the 
addressee will, upon understanding the speaker's utterance, presumably 
think of himself or herself in a first person way, not at the addressee of 
the speaker's utterance. 
Finally, to take an example of Evans's (1982, p. 84), consider Alfred, 
a rational speaker not prone to expressing contradictions who utters 
"This ship is a Japanese steamer but this ship is not a Japanese steamer", 
where he takes himself to be watching two different ships seen through 
two different windows, whereas unbeknownst to him, he has referred 
twice to the same ship. The two occurrences of "this ship" cannot have 
the same "cognitive significance" or cannot express the same narrow 
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thought-constituent si ce to assume otherwise would be inconsistent 
with our assumption that Alfred is (minimally) rational (not prone to 
giving voice to contradictory thoughts or beliefs): if Alfred had realized 
that his two tokens of "this ship" referred to the same ship, he would not 
have uttered the words he uttered. Perhaps -- assuming the ship to be 
descriptively identified -- the narrow content of the thought expressed 
by the first occurrence of "this ship" in Alfred's utterance might be the 
ship visible by the window to my left while the narrow content of the 
thought expressed by the second occurrence of the same words might 
be the ship visible to my right. 4 However the linguistic meaning of the 
demonstrative expression "this ship", unlike the above narrow content 
of the thought expressed by each token, does not change from one 
occurrence to the next. Nor is the meaning of "this ship" identical to 
either sense. So the narrow content of a thought cannot be identical to 
the linguistic meaning of indexical words used to express it. 
The following conclusion seems therefore inescapable: the narrow 
content of a thought cannot be identified with the linguistic meaning of 
indexical words used to express it. But it is incumbent upon the 
content-dualist to say what narrow content might be. Does not the 
above conclusion refute content-dualism? Does not it justify the anti- 
individualist claim that narrow content ought to be called "content by 
courtesy" (cf. Baker 1987)? Before I try to justify a negative response 
to this question, I want to devote the next section to scrutinizing 
Burge's argument for his monist anti-individualist view of content. My 
response to Burge will provide an appropriate background for my 
justification of the claim that content-dualism is not refuted by ac- 
knowledging that the narrow content of a thought cannot be identical to 
linguistic meaning. 
III. BURGE'S  ARGUMENT FOR ANTI - INDIV IDUAL ISM 
First, as we saw in the previous section, Burge denies that "water" is 
indexical. For him "water" on Earth and "water" on Twin Earth are 
two homonyms with two different meanings, two different word-types. 
Perhaps when reporting in our Earthian language what my twin said or 
thought on Twin Earth by his utterance of "water" I ought to use 
"twater", a word invented for the purpose of reporting in my language 
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utterances of, and thoughts expressed by, "water" on Twin Earth. But 
as will become clear later, I do not agree with this suggestion. Burge 
claims that no sense can be made of the dualist assertion that two 
members of a Putnamian pair of doppelg~ingers can be said to express a 
thought with the same narrow content by means of their "water"- 
utterances on Earth and on Twin Earth. As Burge (1982, p. 109) says: 
There is no water on Twin Earth, so [a Twin Earthian] has never had any contact with 
water. Nor has he had contact with anyone else who has had contact with water. 
Further, no one on Twin Earth so much as used a word which means water. It is not 
just that water does not fall in the extension of any of the Twin Earthian's terms. The 
point is that none of their terms even translates into our (non-indexical) word 'water'. 
No Englishvuto-English dictionary would give 'water' as the entry for the Twin 
Eartlfians' word. It would thus be a mystery how a Twin Earthian could share any of 
[an Earthian's] attitudes that involve the notion of water. They have not had the normal 
means of acquiring the concept. The correct view is that they have acquired, by entirely 
normal means, a concept expressed in their language that bears some striking, super- 
ficial similarities to ours. But it is different. 
One of Burge's two reasons for rejecting the dualist view that "water" 
can be used on Earth and on Twin Earth to express a thought-consti- 
tuent with the same narrow content is his already noted critique of the 
claim that "water" is an indexical word. Burge's other reason is that 
causal interaction with two different chemical compounds cannot result 
in identical thought-constituents (or mental representations). To which 
the contentJdualist would of course respond that representations with 
different causes might have different broad contents and the same 
narrow content. 5 
In the present section, I want to lay out Burge's (1979) important 
argument for anti-individualism. To do this, I will first review briefly 
two of Burge's own fascinating thought-experiments. Then I want to 
provide some motivation for weakening the force of the argument. In 
the next section, I will accept the argument as valid and try to show 
how its conclusion can be reconciled with individualism. This done, I 
will explain why I believe that acknowledging that narrow content is not 
identical to linguistic meaning does not refute content-dualism. 
Burge's arthritis example. Let us consider Alfred who suffers from, and 
who thinks that he suffers from, arthritis. He has several correct beliefs 
about his medical condition: he believes that his arthritis in his fingers is 
more painful than his arthritis in his ankles, that his father too had 
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arthritis, that it is better to have arthritis than to have a heart-attack. 
But he also has some incorrect beliefs: one morning, he wakes up with a 
pain in his thigh which reminds him of his other rheumatoid pains and 
he thinks erroneously that his arthritis has spread into his thigh. So he 
consults his doctor who corrects him and informs him that he cannot 
have arthritis in his thigh since arthritis is a disease of the joints, not 
muscles. So he is relieved and he gives up his erroneous belief. 
Let us pause to emphasize the fact that on Burge's view (which I 
assent o), in spite of his misunderstanding about what arthritis really is 
(or in spite of his inaccurate conception of arthritis), Alfred expresses 
beliefs about arthritis by his use of the word "arthritis" and beliefs can 
be ascribed to him by an ascriber using the word "arthritis". 
Let us now imagine #Afred with the same internal constitution and 
the same biography as above living in a hypothetical community mem- 
bers of which speak a Burgian dialect of English which differs from 
actual English merely in that "arthritis" does not have exactly the same 
meaning as in our community: in the counterfactual community, it
refers not to a disease of the joints but to various rheumatoid ailments 
located in joints, tissues, bones and muscles. Everything about Alfred 
(and his fellows) -- his chemical, neurological, physiological, functional 
and behavioral history -- that can be described in non-intentional 
terminology is the same in both communities. When in the counter- 
factual community, Alfred wakes up one morning thinking that he has 
arthritis in his thigh (or should I say "thinking that he has tharthritis in 
his thigh"? -- a thought he would express using the word "arthritis"), he 
decides to pay a visit to his doctor and he expresses his fear that his 
arthritis/tharthritis has spread into his thigh using the exact same word 
form which he uses in the actual community. However in the counter- 
factual community, the doctor corroborates his assumption that he has 
arthritis/tharthritis n his thigh. When Alfred utters the sentence-type "I 
now have arthritis in my thigh" does he or does he not express the same 
belief in both communities? Burge answers: "No". 6 
Burge's ofa example. We imagine that Alfred has several correct and a 
few incorrect beliefs about sofas: e.g. he may correctly believe that sofas 
are pieces of furniture on which people sit, that they are couches; and 
he may also incorrectly believe that broad single-seat armchairs are 
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sofas (which they are not). By the maxim alluded to earlier, although 
Alfred has not entirely mastered the meaning of "sofa" (or has an 
inaccurate conception of what sofas really are), we would still, by 
Burge's light, credit him with the concept of a sofa; he would express 
beliefs about sofas by uttering the word "sofa" and we might ascribe to 
him beliefs about sofas using the word "sofa". 
If we now imagine Alfred with no internal change in a counteffactual 
Burgian community whose members peak a language in which "sofa" 
refers to broad single-seat armchairs as well as to couches, we should 
not, by Burge's light, credit Alfred with the concept of a sofa; and we 
should neither assume that he expresses beliefs about sofas when he 
utters the word "sofa" nor should we ascribe beliefs to him about sofas 
using our word "sofa". Perhaps, as argued in Burge (1986b), should we 
invent the word "safo" to so report Alfred's thought, relative to the 
hypothetical community. 
If we accept Burge's verdict on the facts (both actual and hypo- 
thetical), then what I take to be Burge's (1979) main argument for 
anti-individualism can now be set up in explicit form: 
(1) "Alfred believes that he has arthritis in his thigh" can be 
truly used to ascribe a belief to Alfred relative to the actual 
community; 
(2) "Alfred believes that he has arthritis in his thigh" cannot 
be truly used to ascribe a belief to Alfred relative to the 
counterfactual community; 
(3) Alfred is in an identical internal "physical" state in the actual 
and in the counterfactual community; 
Subconclusion: belief-ascriptions of the form "Alfred believes 
that . . ."  do not merely describe internal states of the be- 
liever or are not made true merely by internal states of the 
believer; 
CONCLUSION C: the truth-conditions of belie&ascriptions 
are partly constituted by facts pertaining to the environment 
of the person who is being ascribed abelief. 
Although the argument is, I believe, a sound one, I note that a theory 
that does not do justice to the intuitive similarities between Alfred's 
mental state in either community when he wakes up one morning 
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thinking and fearing that his arthritis has spread into his thigh seems 
quite implausible to me. A better theory would account for both our 
inclination to say in some circumstances that Alfred has different 
beliefs in the two communities and for our inclination to say in other 
circumstances that he has the same belief in the two communities. As 
Burge (1979, pp. 74--77 and 1982 passim) insists, to evaluate the 
argument, we must restrict ourselves to de dicto belief-ascriptions, i.e. 
to attempts on the part of the ascriber to capture the content of the 
bdiever's point of view by his or her use of relevant terms in oblique 
position embedded in "that"-clauses; we do not consider de re belief- 
ascriptions in which an ascriber can actually use a singular term not to 
try and capture the content of the believer's point of view but to refer 
to what the singular term refers to. However conclusion C does not 
assert hat the (social) environment is a constitutive part of the contents 
of a person's thoughts or beliefs. The further conclusion that the 
contents of a person's thoughts cannot be individuated independently 
from the person's environment has not yet been reached. In order to 
infer the latter conclusion, one has to identify the truth-conditions of a 
belief-ascription with the content of the thought or the belief ascribed. 
This further step -- which I take to be the central issue -- I will 
question in the last section. For now, I want to consider easons to 
mitigate acceptance ofthe first two premisses of the above argument. 
There are two differences between Putnam's and Burge's thought- 
experiments which might be thought to indicate the superiority of 
Burge's thought-experiments over Putnam's as a fuel for anti-individ- 
ualism. First Burge does not rely on the supposition of there being two 
doppelg/ingers since we imagine the very same individual in two 
communities. Second, whereas Putnam's example seemed restricted to 
natural kind words, Burge's thought-experiment seems applicable to 
any word in the language] So Putnam's thought-experiment canonly 
be used by the anti-individualist to argue that the "physical" environ- 
ment is part of the content of an individual's thought when the thought 
is about a fragment of his or her "physical" environment -- a conclusion 
perhaps reminiscent of Evans and McDowell's view about what makes 
a singular thought "available". Burge's thought-experiment canbe used 
to show that an individual's social environment is part of the content of 
any of the individual's thought. 
156 PIERRE JACOB 
IV. CASTING DOUBT UPON BURGE'S PREMISSES 
Now let me try first to weaken the strength of the anti-individualist 
argument by turning the apparent strength of Burge's examples against 
it. What I want to do at present is question the asymmetry involved in 
the joint acceptance of premisses (1) and (2). I want to suggest a kind of 
parity: if a belief can be truly ascribed to Alfred in the actual community 
using certain words in spite of his own inaccurate understanding of the 
meaning of those very words, then there are grounds for ascribing to 
him, relative to the counterfactual community, a belief using the same 
words in spite of differences in the communal meaning of those words. 
Conversely, our grounds for doubting that we can ascribe a belief to 
Alfred, relative to the counterfactual community, ought to be grounds 
for refusing to ascribe to him a belief, relative to the actual community, 
using the same words when, relative to our actual community, Alfred's 
conception of arthritis betrays some misunderstanding. Besides the 
pragmatics of belief-ascriptions, which does I think support parity, I 
want to point out a deep difference between Burge's and Putnam's 
thought-experiments and then I want to scrutinize Burge's insistence on 
the role of an individual's disposition to defer to the opinion of expert 
members of his community for the individuation of the contents of his 
thoughts. Notice that the pragmatic factors I am about to consider are 
properties of de dicto, not de re belief-ascriptions. 
I hasten to add that I accept the principle that Alfred's inaccurate 
conception of arthritis should not prevent us from ascribing to him 
beliefs using the word "arthritis" relative to our actual community. How 
else could we ascribe a belief to him? How else could we describe his 
mistake? Therefore by my parity maxim, I accept it that the same word 
form ought to be usable to ascribe beliefs to him relative to the 
counterfactual community. Unless perhaps Alfred turns out to have an 
expert understanding of "arthritis"; only he thinks that the present 
conception of arthritis as developed in our present community is 
inadequate and he assumes that he has good reasons to believe that 
arthritis is a disease that can occur concurrently in joints, tissues and 
muscles. 
IV.1. A Pragmatic Argument 
Suppose I am talking to Paul. We are both acquainted with Alfred and 
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with the (Burgian) peculiarities of Alfred's linguistic community in 
which "arthritis" is used to refer to rheumatoid ailments in muscles, 
tissues and joints. I want to convey to Paul Alfred's fear that his 
arthritis has spread into his thigh -- a fear that would be relieved in our 
community but will not be in Alfred's community. So I use the words 
"Alfred thinks he has got arthritis in his thigh", although I know and I 
know that Paul knows (and I know that he knows that I know. . . )  that 
"arthritis" does not in Alfred's community refer exactly to what it refers 
to in our community. Notice I am not producing a de re belief-ascription. 
I choose the word "arthritis" because it is the best word in Paul's and 
my language to try and capture Alfred's fear (his own personal or 
subjective perspective on his condition at a certain stage in his life) in 
spite of (or given) the difference between his or our language. It is up 
to the context in which my belief-ascription takes place to fill in the 
missing words: my use of the word "arthritis" in the belief-ascription 
might be supposed to be short for: "what in Alfred's community they 
take arthritis to be" or something of that kind. The fact that my 
utterance abbreviates' my thought, I take to be crucial and will try to 
account for in the next section. I could in this case add further words 
to my report of Alfred's state of mind depending on the amount of 
information about Alfred's community mutually known to me and my 
audience. But I may rely on context. 
This is a widespread linguistic phenomenon -- noted by Donnellan 
(1966) -- which can be illustrated by facts simpler than belief-ascrip- 
tions. Suppose that Paul and I are at a party and we meet Edith in the 
company of John whom Paul mistakenly takes to be Edith's husband 
whereas John is actually Edith's lover. If Paul's belief that John is 
Edith's husband is mutually known to Edith and me, then upon noticing 
the fact that John is walking towards us, I may use the sentence "Your 
husband is coming" to communicate o Edith the proposition that John 
is coming. I might have thereby said something true of John by 
referring to him under the description "your husband". It is then 
plausible to maintain that by using "your husband" I merely "introduce" 
John (Edith's lover, not Michael, Edith's husband) into the proposition 
expressed. 8 Arguably, the definite description "your husband" would be 
short for the longer description "your husband according to Paul" or 
"the man Paul takes to be your husband". Again a case of a thought 
summarized by an utterance. Given its conventional linguistic meaning, 
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the word "husband" can be part of a definite description used to refer 
in most contexts to Edith's actual husband, Michael, and in some 
contexts to John, Edith's lover. I can use the word "husband" to refer 
(directly or indirectly, by means of a reference to Paul's system of 
beliefs) to Edith's lover. Although such uses of words are perfectly 
ordinary, we might rule them out as improper, idealize away from them 
and claim that they require some special treatment, on the ground that 
the concept expressed by the word (here, the concept of being Edith's 
husband) has been improperly invoked. But then it would be odd to 
claim that we can use the word "arthritis" which refers to a disease of 
the joints to ascribe de dicto a belief to Alfred in our actual community 
when it is mutually known to the belief-ascriber and his audience that 
Alfred's conception of arthritis is inaccurate. 
My previous remarks have an obvious bearing on the truth-conditions 
of "arthritis"-sentences uttered in the counterfactual community as we 
assign them in our actual community. As already noted, accepting the 
truth of premiss (2) amounts to assuming that "tharthritis", not "arthritis", 
ought o be used to report in my language Alfred's thought, relative to 
the counterfactual community. So that on Burge's view, the truth-condi- 
tion of Alfred's utterance, relative to the counterfactual community, of 
"I now have arthritis in my thigh" is: 
"I now have arthritis in my thigh" is true iff Alfred has 
tharthritis at the time of utterance. 
Where "arthritis", a word of the counterfactual community, is being 
mentioned and "tharthritis" is being used as a word of my language 
operating as the metalanguage. Presumably, on Burge's view, "tharthritis" 
has an empty extension since according to experts of my (metalinguistic) 
community, there is no disease such that rheumatoid ailments can 
jointly occur in joints and muscles and tissues. So Burge's view entails 
that none of Alfred's thoughts, relative to the counterfactual community, 
expressed by an utterance of "arthritis", is true -- since nothing, by the 
lights of the actual community, satisfies his use of "arthritis": there is no 
disease that occurs concurrently in joints and muscles. We, members of 
the actual community, ought to take the word "arthritis" as used in the 
counterfactual community as a term as devoid of reference as we take 
the word "phlogiston" to be. I think this simply is the homonymy view 
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alluded to earlier with respect o "water". But it is not inevitable. As I 
may take "arthritis" used in the counterfactual community to have a 
partial extension, I may take some of Alfred's thoughts, relative to the 
counterfactual community, expressed by means of his utterance of 
"arthritis" (such as "my father had arthritis") to be true and assign to his 
utterance of "I now have arthritis in my thigh" the following truth- 
condition: 
"I now have arthritis in my thigh" is true iff Alfred has 
arthritis at the time of utterance. 
Just as in the preceding statement of truth-condition, both sides of the 
biconditional being false, the biconditional is true. I would argue that 
were experts of the two communities to get together, experts from the 
counterfactual community would give up their conception of arthritis 
and accept ours. 
IV.2. Why Do "Arthritis"-Utterances Have the Same Truth-Conditions 
in Both Communities ? 
Burge's asymmetric treatment of ascriptions according to whether 
Alfred belongs to one or the other community suggests that Alfred can 
no more be credited with the same concept of arthritis in both com- 
munities than members of a pair of Putnamian doppelggngers could be 
credited with the same concept of water. 
Now I want to resist his suggestion by noticing that "arthritis" is the 
name of a disease. So we expect bio-medical experts in either com- 
munity to uncover truths about the causes and etiology of arthritis -- 
truths which depend on physiological non-intentionally describable 
facts of the matter. On Burge's own hypotheses, Alfred's physiological 
condition does not change from one community to the next. Only 
experts' opinions about the disease vary from one community to the 
next. Presumably experts' opinions about arthritis do not "create" the 
physiological (constant) facts -- they are merely representations made 
true or false (correct or incorrect) by (constant) physiological facts. So 
it makes ense to assume that one community has the facts right and the 
other wrong and that all things being equal, and given enough time, 
experts from both communities will or would converge on their concep- 
160 PIERRE JACOB 
tion of arthritis. Unlike Putnam's example in which "water"-utterances 
on Earth and on Twin Earth have different ruth-conditions (due to 
differences in the chemical environment), "arthritis"-utterances in both 
communities hould be ascribed the same community-independent 
truth-conditions (due to constant physiological conditions in both 
communities). So the natural thing to say is that although the two 
communities have developed two conceptions of arthritis, Alfred may 
be credited with the same concept in both communities: his mental 
carving up of the phenomenon is the same in both communities in spite 
of the fact that some of his utterances of sentences containing the word 
"arthritis" are assigned conflicting truth-values in the two communities. 
True: "arthritis" is a natural kind word and my last point exploits this 
fact. Burge might argue that the point would not carry over to "sofa", 
"contract", "square" or any other word with something like an analytic 
definition. But I (along with Bach 1988) think that this is quite inessen- 
tial. If Alfred assumes mistakenly that rectangles are squares, I can 
ascribe to him, relative to our community, beliefs using the word 
"square". I can imagine doing so relative to a community in which 
"square" refers to squares and rectangles as well. Again the ascription 
of a belief to Alfred, relative to the counterfactual community, using the 
word "square" might be analyzed as an abbreviation for some longer 
utterance involving the words 'what they call "square" in Alfred's 
community'. But this is not to say that the ascription would be im- 
possible. The point is that even though a word may have an analytic 
definition, to determine its contribution to the proposition expressed by 
an utterance of it, one may have to rely on contextual factors such as 
supplying in thought a mental counterpart of a suppressed expression 
referring to the particular use of the word in a community or to a 
person's beliefs. 
1V.3. What ls in a Community? 
Not only do I think parity is supported by pragmatic reasons, but there 
are reasons why, I think, we ought not to accept wholesale Burge's 
point about the role played by an individual's disposition to defer to 
other members of his speech community for the individuation of the 
contents of the individual's thoughts. 
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First, as emphasized in Burge (1986b, pp. 702--703), an individual's 
disposition to defer to experts from his community (and his readiness to 
accept corrections from them) may be -- to some extent -- crucial for 
the individuation ofthe individual's thoughts, ay about arthritis: 
Tile language does not present a standard of competence independent of individuals' 
activity. Minimal competence consists in conformity to the practice of others. "Greatest 
competence" consists in abilities to draw distinctions, to produce precisifications, to use 
numerous linguistic resources, to offer counterexamples to proposed equivalences --
that elicit the reflective agreement of other competent speakers. We may imagine avast, 
ragged network of interdependence, estabfished by patterns of deference which lead 
back to people who would elicit the assent of others. . ,  incomplete understanding... 
does nothing to exempt me from responsibility to communal norms of evaluation when 
I have or express my. . .  beliefs. 
It is indisputable that non-expert speakers do defer to experts with 
respect o the application of specialized words such as "arthritis" (and 
why not "sofa"?): ordinary speakers just learn the meaning of specialized 
words by turning to the opinions of experts (say by consulting dic- 
tionaries or encyclopaedias). But does Burge think that the acquisition 
of any ordinary concept (such as the concept of a human thigh) 
involves the speaker's disposition to defer to members of his or her 
community? Suppose (presumably with Burge) that Alfred's disposition 
to defer to members of his community is crucial not just to the 
individuation of the content of his concept of arthritis but also to that of 
Iris concepts of thighs and joints. Imagine that in the counteffactual 
community the words "thigh" and "joint" are used nonstandardly so that 
it is assumed that there are joints in a person's thigh. Now relative so 
such a counterfactual community, Alfred might believe that he has 
arthritis in his thigh. Would Burge argue that we ought not to ascribe to 
him the belief that he has arthritis in his thigh but rather the belief that 
he has arthritis in his schmigh (where "schmigh" is an invented word in 
my language used to ascribe beliefs to members of the hypothetical 
community about what they call "thigh")? What, according to Burge, is 
a good candidate for being the concept of a thigh? And how to tell, by 
Burge's lights, whether the right ascription of a belief to Alfred, relative 
to the counterfactual community, ought to be "Alfred believes that he 
has tharthritis in his thigh" or "Alfred believes that he has arthritis in 
his schmigh'? The content of Alfred's belief might be partly indeter- 
minate -- he might have standard concepts of thigh and joint and 
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a nonstandard concept of arthritis; or he might have non-standard 
concepts of thigh and joint and a conception of arthritis according to 
which is occurs only in joints (not in any tissue or muscle). We might, I
claim, still use our words "thigh", "joint" and "arthritis" to report, within 
our community, his fear that he has arthritis in his thigh. 
Second, I ask, what about the disposition of expert members of a 
community to argue with experts of a different community? What 
should prevent US from "charitably" supposing that experts from the 
hypothetical community are disposed to open-mindedly examine the 
reasons why experts from the actual community do not take arthritis to 
be jointly a disease occurring in joints and muscles? Burge might 
correctly reply that there is no such thing as a community's disposition 
to defer to the opinion of members of another community, or that such 
a disposition cannot meaningfully be predicated of a community. But 
the point is that individual experts from one community might be 
disposed to examine the opinions of experts from another community 
just as an individual ayman might be disposed to defer to the opinion 
of an expert from his own community. Unless perhaps Burge assumes 
that a community has boundaries which its members cannot cross. But 
this view would have, it seems to me, no more plausibility than the 
view of the incommensurability between paradigms made notorious by 
Thomas Kuhn. Remember: nothing in Putnam's Twin Earth thought- 
experiment entails such a view of the boundaries of a community, since 
it is agreed that expert chemists from both Earth and Twin Earth might 
converge on the view that "water" does not have the same extension on 
Earth and on Twin Earth. 
V. AN INDIV IDUAL IST  ACCOUNT OF BURGE'S  
THOUGHT-EXPERIMENTS 
I have expressed oubts about he joint acceptance of premisses (1) and 
(2) of the Burgian argument because I have doubts that "Alfred believes 
that he has arthritis" may be truly used to ascribe a belief to Alfred 
relative to the actual community and may not be so used to ascribe a 
belief to him relative to the counterfactual community. But suppose 
now we accept Burge's conclusion C that what makes a belief-ascription 
true are not only facts internal to the person who is being ascribed the 
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befief but also facts pertaining to the person's ocial environment. Does 
it then follow that facts from the person's social environment are 
inevitably part of the contents of a person's thoughts? Burge thinks it 
does. As argued in Jacob (1987) along with Loar (1987a, b), I think 
there is room for denying that it does. 9So what is the further premiss 
used by Burge to derive the conclusion that the social environment 
enters the content of an individual's thought (or belief) from conclusion 
C, i.e. from the assumption that the social environment is part of the 
truth-conditions of the belief-ascription? I think the needed premiss is 
that the contribution made by the proposition expressed by the "that"- 
clause to the truth-conditions of the belief-ascription is identical to the 
content of the believer's thought. I want to provide reasons for rejecting 
this identification and therefore for rejecting the anti-individualist asser- 
tion that the environment is part of the contents of a person's thoughts. 
My reasons will also be reasons for not giving up content-dualism and 
reconcile it with due acknowledgment of the fact that the narrow 
content of a thought is not identical to the linguistic meaning of the 
sentence uttered to express it. 
V.1. An Utterance Is an Interpretation of a Thought 
Unlike a person's thought or belief which a belief-ascriber is trying to 
capture, and which is a mental representation, a belief-ascription is an 
utterance. Unlike the believer's mental state which purports to represent 
directly a certain state of affairs (say, that Alfred has arthritis in his 
thigh), the belief-ascription purports to represent directly the believer's 
mental state (Alfred's belief that he has arthritis in his thigh or his view 
of the condition of his thigh) and indirectly the state of affairs (the 
condition of Alfred's thigh). In a belief-ascription, the ascriber selects a 
sentence of his or her language which he or she embeds under the 
scope of the relevant psychological verb: the embedded sentence (or 
"that"-clause) is expected to provide an adequate or revealing charac- 
terization of the believer's thought about the state of affairs. What I am 
going to argue is that there are reasons for denying that the proposi- 
tional contribution made by the "that"-clanse to the whole proposition 
expressed by the belief-ascription (or to the befief-ascription's truth- 
conditions) is identical to the content of the believer's thought or belief. 
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Were the believer himself to express his thought or belief, he would 
utter a simple (unembedded sentence), such as "I now have arthritis in 
my thigh". This sentence has a linguistic meaning, which (because of the 
presence of the indexical "I") we can think of as a logical form with a 
free variable -- not a complete proposition -- with gaps to be filled by 
information drawn from the context of utterance. It expresses the 
proposition that Alfred has arthritis in his thigh. In virtue of its pro- 
positional content, this utterance is used by the speaker to express his 
thought. Both the thought expressed and the utterance used to express 
it can have a truth-value. If Alfred utters in our actual community "I 
now have arthritis in my thigh", both his utterance and his thought are 
false and they have the same truth-conditions: they purport o represent 
or depict (mentally or linguistically) the same state of affairs. An 
advocate of the "theory of direct reference" would presumably assume 
that Alfred and Alfred's thigh are parts of the "singular" (or Russellian) 
proposition expressed by Alfred's utterance. Certainly Alfred and 
Alfred's thigh are parts of the truth-conditions of Alfred's utterance. 
Theorists of direct reference (or singular thought heorists) might assume 
that Alfred and Alfred's thigh are parts of Alfred's thought hat he has 
arthritis in his thigh together with mental representations (or modes of 
presentation) of Alfred and Alfred's thigh -- say by assuming (as does 
Salmon 1986) that one constituent of the thought expressed is the 
ordered pair whose first coordinate is Alfred and whose second coor- 
dinate is a mode of presentation of Alfred or perhaps by assuming (as 
Evans and McDowell do) that a (de re) mode of presentation of an 
individual (or part of an individual) would not be "available" were the 
individual (presented) not to exist. So at least on one possible view of 
the proposition expressed by Alfred's utterance, this singular (Russellian) 
proposition cannot be identical to Alfred's thought since the former is a 
constituent ofthe latter. 
What is relevant o the present argument is the question: given that 
Alfred's thought and Alfred's utterance have the same truth-condition, 
what is the relation between Alfred's thought and Alfred's utterance? 
My answer is that (as argued in Sperber & Wilson 1986, ch. 4), Alfred's 
utterance is an interpretation of Alfred's thought. By interpretation I 
mean a semantic relation different from the relation that holds between 
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on the one hand words or thoughts and on the other hand what satisfies 
them, what they refer to or what has to be the case for them to be true, 
viz. what makes them true or false. A linguistic or mental representation 
of a state of affairs is made true or false by the state of affairs (which it 
purports to describe). A fragment of a linguistic or mental representa- 
tion can be said to refer to a constituent of a state of affairs. But unlike 
referential or truth-conditional semantic relations which hold between 
representations (whether mental or linguistic) and non-representations, 
an interpretive relation holds between two representations. 
What makes a representation R a good interpretation of another 
representation R' is not that R is made true by R'. Consider the case of 
a translation: we have a set of utterances or inscriptions of sentences 
from one language used to stand for another set of utterances or 
inscriptions of sentences from another language. So translation is a 
relation between two sets of linguistic representations. What makes it 
the case that the former set can "stand for" the latter? Although there 
are correct and incorrect ranslations, we do not say that the translating 
utterances "are made true" by the translated utterances. We do not 
say that a piece of indirect quotation "is made true" by the reported 
utterances. Neither do we say, in the case of a summary, that the 
summarizing utterances "are made true" by the summarized utterances 
or that exegetical utterances "are made true" by the aphoristic utterances 
(subjected to exegesis). In the case of translation, a translator first 
grasps the set of propositions expressed by the sentences initially 
u~tered in one language. He then looks for sentences in his or her 
language which will appropriately express the set of propositions in 
question. He will try to pick up in his language sentences with the same 
linguistic meaning (or semantic structure) as the sentences originally 
uttered. 
In translation, what makes a translation a good one might be the 
identity between the set of propositions expressed by the translating 
utterances and the set of propositions expressed by the translated 
utterances. But what of a summary or an exegesis? By assumption, the 
two sets of propositions are not identical: the set of summarizing 
propositions i smaller than the set of summarized propositions and the 
set of exegetical propositions i larger than the set of initially expressed 
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propositions. So identity between two sets of propositions cannot be 
what makes a summary a good one any more than it can make an 
exegesis a good one. Rather the set of summarizing propositions must 
resemble the set of summarizing propositions, the former must be a 
good prototype or sample of the latter. Exegesis being the converse of 
summary, the set of initially expressed propositions must be a good 
prototype or sample of the exegetical propositions. In both cases, the 
two sets of propositions resemble ach other -- identity being a limiting 
case of similarity. 
I want to apply my claim that interpretation holds by virtue of logical 
or propositional resemblance or similarity to the relation between a 
person's thought (or belief) and the utterance used to express it. Now 
there is a difference between on the one hand translation, summary and 
exegesis and on the other hand the expression of a thought by means 
of an utterance. In translation, summary, or exegesis the relation is 
between two sets of utterances. When an utterance xpresses a thought 
the relation holds between an utterance and something else (a thought). 
Arguably, what makes a thought different from an utterance is that, 
unlike the sentence-type uttered which can be quoted, a thought-type 
cannot. However, granted that we do not know how to quote a thought, 
what makes it possible for utterances to be interpretively related to one 
another is that they express propositions. So if we assume that a 
thought may have a propositional form, structure and content, then a 
thought may be held to have all the required ingredients to enter into 
an interpretive relation with an utterance or with another thought. 
Hence there is no good reason not to view the interpretive relation 
between a thought and the utterance used to express it as based on the 
logical or propositional resemblance between them. I suggest hat in 
virtue of its propositional form, an utterance can be held to summarize 
a thought. 
Of course when I distinguish the interpretive relation between two 
representations from other semantical referential or truth-conditional 
relations, I am not denying that a representation can refer to another 
representation as when you Say "This last proposition is intriguing" or 
"Paul's thought last Thursday was trivial". Then part of the utterance is
supposed to refer to a proposition or a thought. But I am distinguishing 
interpretation from truth and reference. 
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V.2. Content-Dualism Reconciled With Recognition That Narrow 
Content Is Not Linguistic Meaning 
I claimed at the end of the first section that content-dualism can 
accommodate the fact that the narrow content of a thought is not 
identical to the linguistic meaning of indexical expressions used to 
express it. Indeed to acknowledge that the linguistic meaning of 'T' is 
not identical with the narrow content of the thought-constituent xpres- 
sible by an utterance of 'T' is compatible with the claim that the former 
is an interpretation of the latter, that they resemble ach other. The 
speaker cannot offer his audience direct access to his first person 
thought-constituent about himself or herself. But in virtue of its lin- 
guistic meaning, 'T' is the most straightforward route by which the 
speaker can direct his or her audience's attention and thought-processes 
upon himself or herself (the speaker). What makes the linguistic mean- 
ing of 'T' relevantly similar to the narrow content of a first person 
thought-constituent is that, for each utterance of a token of "I", both are 
modes of presentation of the same person -- they share the same 
reference on each occasion. As noted by McGinn (1983, ch. 5), there is 
the following parallel: on the one hand the linguistic meaning of "I" 
always presents its referent in the same way (as the speaker or the 
utterer of this token of 'T') but each token of "I" may refer to a 
different person. On the other hand although two persons may have 
different particular conceptions of themselves (different first person 
thought-tokens), each of those conceptions might be tokens of the same 
first person thought-type. And this might be true even though the 
linguistic meaning of the word-type 'T' is not identical to the content of 
the first person thought-type expressed by any token of 'T'. 
In Evans's example of the rational speaker expressing two thought- 
constituents with different narrow contents by means of two tokens of 
the same words ("this ship") with one and the same linguistic meaning, 
assuming that the ship is descriptively identified, it is plausible to say 
that the linguistic meaning of "this ship" (perhaps "the ship most salient 
in the context of utterance") is a summary or an abbreviation of the 
narrow content of the thought-constituent, the ship visible to my left~ 
right, where, as we saw, summary is a typical interpretive relation that 
holds in virtue of logical resemblance. Perhaps the objection could be 
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made that I am presupposing that the rational speaker's mental mode of 
presentation of the ship is descriptive whereas actually the ship is 
presented (or identified) demonstratively (orperceptually), not descrip- 
tively. I take it that a third person with no perceptual ccess to the ship 
(such as the writer or the reader of the present paper) would however 
represent to himself or herself the rational speaker's demonstrative (or 
perceptual) mode of presentation of the ship descriptively -- by means 
of something like the ship visible to his [the rational speaker's] leftMght. 
Such a descriptive mode of presentation might be thought of as a 
second-order mental representation r interpretation (in the mind of a 
third person with no perceptual access to the ship) of the rational 
speaker's first-order demonstrative mode of presentation of the ship. 
The descriptive mode of presentation of the ship might therefore be 
thought of as an exegetical expansion of, or a conceptual comment 
upon, the demonstrative mode of presentation f the ship. 
Now, as I said, the purpose of a (de dicto) belief-ascription ("Alfred 
believe that p") is to characterize the believer's viewpoint. First, there 
are two aspects to the subject's tate: his or her attitude and the content 
of his or her attitude. The former is described by the psychological verb 
preceding the "that"-clause. Second and more importantly, given that 
the belief-ascription has truth-conditions, there are two semantic rela- 
tions to be distinguished: (a) the relation between either the proposition 
expressed by the ascriber's utterance of "p" (in the process of uttering 
the whole ascription) or the believer's thought and their common truth- 
conditions; (b) the relation between the proposition expressed by the 
utterance of "p" (in the process of uttering the whole sentence) and the 
content of the believer's thought. 
V.3. Two Mistaken Assumptions About a Thought Ascribed 
One of two assumptions might help the anti-individualist to the conclu- 
sion that the environmental f cts which are part of the truth-conditions 
of the belief-ascriptions are parts of the content of the believer's 
thought: 
(A) that the proposition expressed by the ascriber's utterance of "p" 
(and named by "that p") is identical to the content of the believer's 
thought; 
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03) that the proposition expressed by the ascriber's utterance of "p" 
is made true by the content of the believer's thought. 
I reject both (A) and 03). 
The belief-ascription asa whole can be said to describe the believer's 
state: if the believer is not in the state imputed to him by the ascription, 
the latter will be false. So belief-ascriptions have truth-conditions which 
may well, as emphasized by Burge, include facts from the believer's 
(social) environment. Arguably, the proposition expressed by the entire 
ascription may depend compositionally on the propositional contribu- 
tion made by the "that"-clause. So "that p" may be taken to be a 
singular term naming or referring to the proposition expressed by the 
utterance of "p". But this does not mean that the proposition amed by 
"that p" and expressed by the ascriber's utterance of "p" in the process 
of his whole utterance is identical to the content of the believer's 
thought. 
A proposition or a thought may be referred to in a variety of ways, 
just like a number may be referred to in a variety of ways. But not all 
ways of referring to a proposition, a thought or a number supply a 
revealing characterization f the proposition, thought or number. I may 
refer to the number 6 as "my younger brother's favorite even number". 
This may or not enable you to pick out the number 6. If in response to 
questions uch as "What did Paul say (or what does Paul think)?", I say: 
"Paul said (or thinks) what Mary said (or thought) last Friday", I may 
have successfully referred to a thought or a proposition expressed by an 
utterance by means of the relative clause "what Mary said (or thought) 
. . ."  But I have not thereby automatically supplied a proposition such 
that if you grasp it you will be able to interpret he thought or proposi- 
tion I have referred to. I can choose to name "AI" Paul's thought or the 
proposition he expressed, and refer to either as A1. Suppose Francois 
utters some French words. Suppose you do not understand French and 
you ask me "What did Franqois say?". Suppose I faithfully reproduce 
another token of the French word-types Frangois just uttered (I quote 
Fran~ois's words). I have not thereby automatically provided for you (if 
you do not speak French) a revealing characterization of Franqois's 
thought. Similarly, if I successfully refer to Paul's thought or to the 
proposition expressed by Paul's utterance by using the name "AI", I 
may have done so without expressing a proposition. It is one thing to 
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use a linguistic device to refer to a proposition or a thought; it is another 
thing to express aproposition capable of interpreting a thought. 
In a belief-ascription, "that p" (just like "AI") may well name, or 
refer to, the proposition expressed by an utterance of "p". But it does 
not thereby name, or refer to, the believer's thought. Rather, insofar as 
the job of the belief-ascription is to provide a revealing characterization 
of the content of the believer's thought, the utterance of "p" expresses a 
proposition (referred to by "that p" or named "A I " )  which is an 
i n te rpreta t ion  - -  a summary  - -  of the believer's thought and which does 
its job (or fulfills its role) if it resembles appropriately the believer's 
thought. But it need not be identical to it. In fact, if it is a summary of 
the believer's thought, it cannot be identical to it. So I reject (A). 
As I said, the belief-ascription as a whole has a truth-condition. It 
includes the "that"-clause as a component. When uttering "Alfred 
believes that p", the belief-ascriber utters "that p" (as part of his whole 
speech act). Although he may thereby refer to the proposition expressed 
by his uttering "p" (a sub-part of his whole speech act), his utterance of 
"p" is not made true (or false) by the content of the believer's thought. 
His utterance of "p" (in this context) purports to be faithful to (to 
adequately depict or resemble) the content of the believer's thought in 
virtue of the proposition thereby expressed (and referred to by the 
larger constituent " hat p"). So the overall belief-ascription may well be 
made true or false by a state of the believer's (together with facts from 
the environment). But to assume, as 03) would have it, that the content 
of the believer's thought makes true the proposition expressed by the 
ascriber's utterance of "p" is to fall victim to a l eve l  confusion: the 
believer's thought and the ascriber's utterance of "p" purport to repre- 
sent or describe the fact (a fact which is neither mental nor linguistic) 
that Alfred has or not arthritis in his thigh. In the process of expressing 
a proposition with the above truth-condition, the ascriber offers an 
interpretation of the content of the believer's thought. Similarly, if I 
translate an utterance from French to English, the proposition expressed 
by my English utterance will have presumably the same truth-condition 
as the French utterance. But my English utterance (or the proposition I 
thereby express) is not made true by the French utterance. I therefore 
reject 03). 
So the truth-conditions of the belief-ascription i clude as a corn- 
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ponent an interpretive r lation (not a truth-conditional one) between 
the content of the believer's thought and the proposition expressed by 
the ascriber's utterance of "p" (named by the utterance of "that p"). 
And the proposition expressed by uttering "p" during the utterance of 
the whole ascription is not itself made true by the content of the 
believer's thought. Rather both the utterance of "p" and the (content of 
the) believer's thought are made true or false by a state of affairs (say 
by the condition of Alfred's thigh). 
I argued in section IV for what I referred to as the parity principle: 
grounds for using the word "arthritis" to ascribe to Alfred, relative to 
the actual community, the belief that he has arthritis in his thigh ought 
to be grounds for using the same word to also ascribe to Alfred, 
relative to the counterfactual community, the belief that he has arthritis 
in his thigh. Conversely, grounds for refusing to use the word "arthritis" 
to ascribe a belief to Alfred, relative to the counterfactual community, 
ought to be grounds for refusing to use the same word for ascribing a 
belief to Alfred relative to the actual community. The reason is that the 
concept expressed by the ascriber's use of the word "arthritis" must 
logically resemble the concept mentally represented in the believer's 
mind as part of his thought so as to preserve propositional resemblance 
between Alfred's thought and the proposition expressed by the ascriber's 
ulLterance of "p" (in the process of uttering the ascription). If resem- 
b][ance is thereby achieved, relative to our community, it may be 
achieved, relative to the counterfactual community as well. If it cannot 
be achieved, relative to the counterfactual community, it can no more 
b,e achieved, relative to our community. 
Consider the ascription to Alfred, relative to the actual community, 
by a medical authority of the belief that he (Alfred) has arthritis in his 
thigh: the medical expert utters "he has arthritis in his thigh" as part of 
his whole utterance (where by "he" the expert refers to Alfred and 
by "his thigh" he refers to Alfred's thigh). He thereby expresses a
proposition which he takes to be false (a proposition made false by the 
condition of Alfred's thigh). Perhaps he refers to this false proposition 
by his utterance of "that he has arthritis in his thigh". However this false 
proposition is not identical to the content of Alfred's thought hat he 
has arthritis in his thigh. On the assumption that they are identical, it 
becomes difficult (if not mysterious) to make sense of the fact that part 
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of Alfred's thought involves the mistaken assumption that arthritis can 
be located in one's thigh. However the proposition expressed by the 
expert's utterance of "he has arthritis in his thigh" (which does not 
involve the mistaken assumption in question) may be a good inter- 
pretation of Alfred's thought: in virtue of the similarity between the 
two, it may provide an adequate summary of Alfred's thought. If so, it 
seems to me, my own utterance of "he has arthritis in his thigh" could 
be held to summarize the thought Alfred has in the counterfactuat 
community. 
I am not saying that Burge would endorse the truth of (B), i.e. that 
the belief-ascriber's utterance of "p" (as part of his overall utterance) is
made true (or false) by the content of the believer's thought or that he 
denies that the ascriber's utterance of "p" and the believer's thought are 
both made true (or false) by the same state of affairs. But I am 
suggesting that proper recognition of the fact that the proposition 
expressed by the ascriber's utterance of "p" is intended to interpret he 
content of the subject's thought by being an appropriate summary of it 
allows us to resist Burge's anti-individualist conclusion that what has to 
be the case for the ascriber's utterance of "p" to be true also constitutes 
the content of the subject's belief. 
The view that the proposition expressed by the ascriber's utterance 
of a sentence containing say "arthritis" is an intended interpretation of
the believer's thought expressible by the believer's use of "arthritis" 
makes room for the distinction (argued for e.g. in Bach 1988) between 
an individual's concept of arthritis and the meaning of the word 
"arthritis" as determined by expert members of the individual's com- 
munity. Bach (1988, note 3, p. 88) sharply distinguishes between using 
"a word one incompletely understands" and thinking "with a concept 
that one incompletely understands". He accuses Burge of equating the 
former phenomenon, which he takes to be perfectly intelligible, with the 
latter, which he takes not to be so, on the ground that "to understand a 
concept" just is to possess it. Unlike Bach however, I am not so sure 
that thinking with a concept one incompletely understands does not 
make sense. If we merely assume that the meaning of a specialized 
scientific word is a (scientific) concept, then I think it makes sense to 
say of a non-scientist individual, who has an incorrect or partial grasp 
of the meaning of the word, that he thinks with a concept he incom- 
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pletely understands: his own concept would be a partial second order 
interpretive r presentation f the full scientific oncept. 
Just as it is possible to ascribe thoughts to an individual who is not a 
physicist using words from physics which he incompletely understands, 
one could -- assuming concepts to be sets -- characterize an individual's 
concept as his or her possession of a subset, or a superset of, the scien- 
tific concept. I would argue that just as there must exist a resemblance 
relation between the public meaning of the word "arthritis" and the 
individual's concept, the latter may resemble a scientific concept with- 
out being identical to it. Furthermore an individual ayman may store a 
complex concept expressible by a word competently used by scientific 
experts as a child might entertain the metalinguistic representation f a 
word as a lexical entry referring to whatever phenomenon or magnitude 
the expert (or adult) takes it to refer to. The individual's concept might 
reduce to the lexical entry of the word expressing the concept, in which 
case we might be reluctant to ascribe the concept to the individual. 
Let me sum up. In the present paper I have tried on the one hand to 
show that recognition that narrow content cannot be identical with 
linguistic meaning is not fatal to content-dualism. On the other hand 
I have tried to provide an individualist account of Burge's thought- 
experiments such that recognition that the truth-conditions of belief- 
ascriptions include aspects of the believer's (social) environment does 
not entail that those environmental spects are thereby parts of the 
contents of the person's thoughts. This account is based on the view 
that the proposition contributed by the clause prefixed by "that" (in the 
belief-ascription) is an interpretation of the believer's thought. 
NOTES 
Thanks to Ned Block, Steven Davis, Lawrence Hirschfeld and Franqois Recanafi or 
discussion. 
As recognized by Tyler Burge (1986, p. 10), the main representative of social anti- 
individualism, "psychology is not a monolith. Different explanatory tasks and types of 
explanation coexist within it. In questioning the view that psychology is individualistic, I 
am not thereby doubting whether there are subparts of psychology that conform to the 
strictures of individualism". I take the "subparts of psychology" (in the last sentence) to
refer inter alia to the cognitive psychological study of "subdoxastic" mental states (in 
Stich's 1978b sense). And so Burge would acknowledge that an individual's subdoxastic 
states may be individuafistically construed. As explicitly emphasized byBurge, his view 
applies to intentionally describable mental states. Where exactly does the boundary 
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between intentional and subdoxastic lie? This is question the anti-individualist ought to 
face. 
2 Fodor (1987, ch. 2) argues, I think convincingly, that the fact that my brain, unlike 
my doppelgfinger's, contains H20 molecules or lives in a body containing H20 mole- 
cules is irrelevant to the individuatioa ofour brain states. 
Maxim (a) can be severely construed -- as asserting the identity between mental 
content and truth-conditions -- or fiberally construed -- as asserting that content 
should determine truth-conditions (perhaps as a function taking contexts as arguments 
and truth-conditions as values). Eliminativists with respect to content (e.g. Stich) 
typically construe (a) severely; dualists (such as Block and Fodor) construe it liberally. 
4 I say "perhaps" for such a narrow content presupposes ("perhaps" wrongly) that 
Alfred's mode of identification of the ship is descriptive (non-demonstrative). 
5 For purposes of refuting content-dualism, Baker (1987) imagines that on Mars there 
are no red objects, that Martians wear special glasses which are never removed and 
which are such that light reflected from grey objects affects Martians' transducers in 
exactly the way that light reflected from red objects affect Earthians' transducers on 
Earth. Consider a pair of doppelgfingers, one on Earth, one on Mars. They have the 
same experience of red. But one's experience is caused by his perception of a red 
object; the other's experience is caused by his perception of a grey object. Were the 
Martian located on Earth and were he to remove his glasses, he would experience the 
perception of red objects as red. Were the Earthian located on Mars and were he to 
wear the special glasses, the content of his experience would be identical to the 
Martian's. Furthermore the inferential potential of the Martian's experience caused by 
his perception of grey objects is identical to the inferential potential of the Earthian's 
experience caused by his perception of red objects. The two mental states have different 
causes with many similar effects. Baker eIaims that ~ter thought-experiment skews that 
no concept of narrow content can meet reasonable constraints on content -- such as 
that "(mental) representations denote properties of distal objects to which their tokens 
are causally related" and that "if two tokens of (mental) representations denote different 
properties, then they are of different ypes of representation". By the first constraint, 
the Earthian's mental representation denotes red objects; the Martian's mental repre- 
sentation denotes grey objects. By the second constraint, both representations are 
distinct. I think that the second constraint begs the question against narrow content and 
should not be subscribed to by a content-dualist. 
6 As noted by Steven Davis in a letter, on Burge's view, it is wrong to claim that, 
relative to the ceunterfzctuat community, Alfred believes (or tNnks) that he has 
arthritis in his thigh upon waking up one morning when he does have this belief (or 
thought), relative to the actual community. Nor should we say that, in the counteffactual 
community, the doctor confirms Alfred's suspicion that he has arthritis in his thigh. 
Rather, relative to the counterfactual community, he believes that he has tharthritis in 
his thigh. However this is just to say that Burge jointly accepts what I call a few 
paragraphs below premisses (1) and (2) -- a joint acceptance which can, I think, be 
questioned on grounds of what I call "parity" (see below), since "arthritis" might be the 
best word in my language to report or ascribe Alfred's state of mind, relative to the 
counterfactual community, even if "arthritis" is short for 'what they call "arthritis" in 
Alfred's community'. 
7 The second difference has been emphasized byKeith Donnellan (1989). 
8 It is an open question, I think, whether one ought to say in tiffs case that the pro- 
position that John is coming is a Grician implicature indirectly inferred by Edith from 
the proposition directly and misleadingly expressed by my utterance, i.e. that Edith's 
husband is coming. Or whether one ought to say that it is part of the propositional 
content directly expressed by my utterance by means of my use of an expression that 
Paul would or might have used. There are, I think, general reasons for assuming that 
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Grician pragmatic factors contribute to the content of the proposition explicitly (or 
dire.ctly) expressed by an utterance -- not just to the content of the propositions 
indirectly conveyed by an utterance. 
9 [,oar (1987a) argues that "sameness of de dicto or oblique ascription" is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for "sameness of psychological content". He pro- 
duces (pp. 102--103) an elegant variation on Kripke's (1979) puzzle about Pierre in 
which, when transported toLondon, unaware that "Londres" and "London" refer to the 
same city, Pierre (who, prior to his move to London, was disposed to assent o the 
French sentence "Londres est jolie") is now disposed to assent to the English sentence 
"London is pretty". So in both situations, we are led by ordinary principles of belief- 
ascription to attribute to Pierre the belk f that Lot ion is pretty (a belief he would either 
express by uttering, or assenting to, a French sentence or by uttering, or assenting to, an 
English sentence). However, Loar argues convincingly that, on a de dicto obfique read- 
ing, the same ascription ought to be said on the two occasions to reveal distinct beliefs 
each with a different psychological content -- with a different inferential potential. 
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